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EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS APPLIED 
TO ADVICE BY AN ATTORNEY TO HIS CLIENT, 
REFLECTING ON JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 
A recent case from the Federal District Court for Nevada, 
In re Bull,1 raises some interesting problems as to the extent to 
which an attorney's advice which reflects on judicial integrity 
is privileged. The attorney who was a defendant in a disbarment 
2;; Section 81-319 of the Nebraska Blue-Sky Law imposes a minor excep-
tion to this conclusion. The Blue-Sky Law requires corporations which 
have been in continuous operation less than three years, and those which, 
having been in continuous operation more than three years, have not met 
certain minimum earnings requirements to obtain an authorization order 
from the Department of Banking before issuing or selling securities. Any 
applicant receiving such an authorization order is prohibited by § 81-319 
from declaring or distributing a " ... dividend of any kind or _in any amount 
whatsoever until such dividend has been actually earned and received by 
the applicant through the medium of net profits earned and received by 
the applicant from its business at the time such dividend is declared.'' 
This restriction, which applies to only a very small fraction of the 
corporations operating in the state, seems to be grounded on a theory that: 
(a) at least three years is required for a corporation to become established 
to the point where it can operate with no further state supervision, and 
that (b) during this period of incipiency it deceives the shareholders and 
creditors to pay dividends from a source other than profits actually earned 
and received. 
This exception to § 21-175 supports the general tenor of the policy 
considerations outlined above, but since it covers such an insignificant 
portion of the existing corporations, it can hardly be interpreted as con-
flicting with § 21-175. 
1123 F. Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954). 
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proceeding had unsuccessfully represented a client in a previous 
criminal case, and the client was serving a jail sentence. In a 
letter2 to the client on the advisability of appealing the conviction, 
the attorney stated, among other things, that experience had shown 
that the records of any trial in that judge's court were emascul-
ated when an appeal was taken; that the judge had a very dear 
friend on the circuit court; and that the conduct of the judge 
at trial had been so reprehensible that the attorney was willing 
to go to great lengths to secure a reversal. The letter was in-
tercepted by the client's jailor and was made the basis for the 
disbarment action. The court decided that the letter was clearly 
not a privileged communication and was admissible in evidence. 
But the court concluded that an attorney's advice to an hnprisoned 
client could not be made the basis for disbarment since the client 
might thereby be deprived of his constitutional right to effective 
assistance from counsel.3 
A slight variation of the Bull facts could produce a common, 
and yet difficult and infrequently litigated situation. Assume 
that a similar letter had been sent to a client not in prison; or 
that similar contemptuous remarks had been made in confidence 
by the attorney to his client in the privacy of the attorney's 
chambers and in preparation for civil litigation. Assume fur-
ther that such remarks were made (a) in good faith and with 
sound justification in fact, or (b) with malicious intentions and 
without the slightest foundation in fact. In what manner and 
to what extent are such remarks privileged? 
A privilege may be either of two types: (1) an evidentiary 
privilege, such as an attorney-client privilege or physician-patient 
privilege, under which the remarks would be completely inad-
missible in evidence, or (2) a substantive privilege, such as used 
in the law of defamation, under which an attorney's advice would 
be admitted in evidence but would be considered (a) qualifiedly 
privileged, or (b) absolutely privileged. A qualified substantive 
privilege remains operative only as long as reasonably and hon-
estly used, while an absolute substantive privilege would protect 
an attorney's remarks no matter how unreasonable or malicious 
they might be. 
The purpose of this note is (1) to examine the attorney-client 
evidentiary privilege to determine under what circumstances an 
attorney's advice, reflecting upon judicial integrity, is privileged 
2 The letter is set forth in totum at 390 in the Bidl case. 
3 In re Bull, 123 F. Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954). 
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from admission in evidence, and (2) to determine the nature of 
a substantive privilege, if any, that may be extended to such ad-
vice. 
I. The Att01'ney-Client Privilege in Evidence 
A. HISTORICAL AND POLICY BASIS 
Historically, the basis of the attorney-client privilege was 
the theory that the honor of the attorney could not be violated 
by compelling him to reveal anything conveyed to him in confi-
dence by a client.-! Therefore, the privilege was originally for 
the benefit of the attorney and not the client. But under modern 
theory it is generally agreed that the privilege is exclusively for 
the benefit of the client.u It is felt that in the present complex 
society, the fullest freedom of communication between a client and 
his attorney should be encouraged if justice is to be done; and 
only by granting a privilege to this communication can such a 
result be achieved. Further, proper presentation of the client's 
cause is believed to outweigh the possible harm resulting from 
suppressing such evidence in particular cases.6 
A necessary corollary of the privilege has been its extension 
to communications from the attorney to his client as well as from 
the client to the attorney. Since the privilege was first said to 
be for the attorney, the early cases assumed that such communica-
tions were inadmissible.7 As a result, the question of whether 
the lawyer's communications are privileged has seldom been 
raised.8 The reason lies generally in the possibility that infer-
ences could be drawn from the attorney's advice, which might 
tend to disclose the client's original communication. Hence, ad-
vice given by an attorney, which might tend, if disclosed, to re-
veal a previous communication from a client, is universally thought 
to be privileged from admission in evidence. 
4 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2290, 2291 (3d ed. 1940) for a general 
review of the history and policy basis of the privilege. See Model Code 
of Evidence, Rule 210. comment a (1942). 
u 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2321 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan and Maguire, 
Cases and 1\Iaterials on Evidence 376 n. 53 (3d ed. 1951). 
tl Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd per 
curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); :Model Code of Evidence. 
Rule 210, comment a (1942). 
7 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2320 (3d ed. 1940). 
~ Wigmore cites only one case raising the question, and a reasonably 
exhaustive search by the writer yielded no further cases in which it was 
contended that communications from attorney to client might not come 
within the privilege. 
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It is interesting to note, however, that remarks by an attor-
ney questioning judicial integrity, as in the Bull situation, or the 
hypothetical situations posed above, will often have no direct re-
lation to an earlier communication by the client. That is, their 
introduction into evidence will not reveal an earlier communica-
tion from the client. Case authority for the privilege or non-
privilege status of such remarks is practically non-existent;!! It 
has been argued, however, that in such situations an attorney 
should be given complete freedom to express his frank opinions 
to his client, and the best way to accomplish this purpose is to 
include such remarks within the attorney-client privilege. 
Undoubtedly, under proper circumstances it may be desirable 
to encourage an attorney to take his client into confidence and 
comment on deficiencies in the judiciary which he honestly and 
reasonably believes may have a bearing on the presentation of 
a client's cause. If the attorney could not comment on the con-
duct of the judiciary, he might hesitate to speak when he should, 
and his client's cause might thereby suffer. Indeed, Canon 8 
of the Canons of Professional Ethics may lend some support to 
the argument. It states: 
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's 
cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid 
opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or contem-
plated litigation.IO 
If Canon 8 is to be complied with, an attorney obviously can-
not close his eyes to the possibility of shortcomings in the oper-
ation of our judicial system, and if he perceives such shortcom-
ings, it may be his ethical duty to call them to his client's atten-
tion. 
The argument, of course, does not suggest that malicious or 
reckless attacks against the judiciary should be encouraged. But 
it should be carefully noted that exclusion of an attorney's ad-
vice from evidence might produce that very result since it would 
prevent a determination of whether advice by an attorney was 
given in good faith and reasonably. Distinction as to whether 
the advice was advanced (a) in good faith and with factual jus-
tifiction, or (b) with malicious intention and complete lack of 
foundation in fact, would become completely irrelevant, and in-
stead the attorney's statements would be extended protection 
amounting in effect to an absolute substantive privilege. 
9 Ex parte Cole, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 2,973, at 35 (C.C.D. Ia. 1879), cited 
in the Bull case, is apparently the only reported case squarely on point. 
10 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. 
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There are policy factors militating against such a result. 
Because the layman is encouraged to, and often does, place su-
preme confidence in the opinions of his attorney, any statements 
reflecting on the operation or integrity of the judiciary are apt 
to be taken at face value. If the court makes rulings adverse to 
the client, he very likely will spread the attorney's remarks in 
rationalization or recrimination. The harmful effect is apparent. 
If litigants are to be encouraged to bring their disputes into the 
courts for peaceful and equitable settlement, public opinion of 
judicial integrity should be maintained at a high level. Exposing 
the judiciary to reckless or malicious collateral attack by mem-
bers of the bar could undoubtedly undermine confidence in our 
system of jurisprudence.11 In fact, Canon 1 of the Canons of 
Professional Ethics12 indicates that a lawyer should not attack 
the judiciary collaterally. It provides: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a 
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent 
of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme im-
portance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, 
are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against 
unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground 
for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty 
of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. 
In such cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encour-
aged and the person making them should be protected.13 
Admittedly, bona fide criticism of the judiciary may be neces-
sary for adequate preparation of many cases; but the protec-
tion of reckless criticism seems unnecessary if any other means 
of encouraging free expression by the attorney can be utilized. 
It would seem, therefore, that the attorney-client privilege in 
evidence should not be extended to protect legal advice reflecting 
on judicial integrity, unless it might also tend to disclose a prior 
communication from the client. 
B. WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE 
It is interesting to note, however, that even if it be assumed 
that all remarks by an attorney should be inadmissible, hazards 
arising from the common law doctrine of waiver might deter 
unrestrained expression by the attorney.14 Case authority in the 
11 These policy considerations led the court in the Bull case to admit 
the attorney's remarks in evidence. 
12 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. 
13 Emphasis supplied. 
H 8 \Yigmore, Evidence § 2327 (3d ed. 1940) treats waiYer of the privi-
lege in general. 
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waiver area has arisen almost exclusively in situations where 
disclosures by the client are sought to be kept from evidence-
the resulting secrecy benefiting the client. Hence, waiver of the 
privilege has properly been based solely upon the conduct of the 
client. It would seem, therefore, that where statements by the 
attorney are sought to be kept out of evidence, waiver of its 
benefit should be based only upon the attorney's subsequent con-
duct. An attorney might certainly be hesitant to speak if the 
privilege attached to his remarks might subsequently be waived 
by the acts of others. But the holding of the Bull case, consid-
ered with the historical and policy bases of the privilege, gives 
reason to believe that when evidence of an attorney's advice is 
introduced, a court may conclude that the privilege " ... is a pro-
tective device available only to or on behalf of the client,''1U and 
therefore hold that waiver of its benefit is to be determined solely 
from the client's conduct. 
Because of this possibilty, various waiver situations will be 
considered to point out the risks to which an attorney would be 
subject if his privilege is merely evidentiary. The most frequent 
situations where the attorney's remarks will be submitted in 
evidence are disciplinary proceedings or tort actions against the 
attorney. Ordinarily, in such proceedings the attorney's remarks 
will have reached persons other than the client to whom they 
were made or the action against the attorney probably would 
not have been instituted. Where the remarks by the attorney 
are oral, they may have been passed on to others in one of three 
ways. They may reach others by some voluntary act of the 
client independent of the attorney-client relation; for example, 
the client may voluntarily pass the remarks on to others by word 
of mouth. If the client fails to assert his privilege when the 
attorney's remarks are later sought to be introduced into evi-
dence, some courts would probably conclude that the privilege 
has been waived.16 Of course, if the client chooses to testify, 
there is no doubt that his waiver of the privilege could not be 
objected to by his attorney.17 
15 In re Bull, 123 F. Supp. 389, 390 (D. Nev. 1954). 
16 Assuming the hearsay problem could be solved. 
17 Even if the client is not a party to the action against the attorney, 
he may properly assert the privilege if called as a witness. The situa-
tion causing the trouble is where the client, though not a party to the 
action, claims the privilege only to have it erroneously denied. There 
are cases holding that a party to an action cannot take advantage of a 
witness' privilege. See State v. Madden, 161 Minn. 132, 201 N.W. 297 
(1924) and State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P.2d 1097 (1935). Hence, 
' 
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Where the attorney's remarks reach third parties as a result 
of being volunteered by the attorney, such a communication is 
not made in confidence and the privilege does not apply.18 And 
some courts hold that when a communication which would other-
wise be protected under the attorney-client privilege is over-
heard, either inadvertently or by deliberate eavesdropping, the 
"eavesdropping" party is competent to testify. Wigmore calls 
this the "eavesdropper" rule.19 The rationale of the rule is that 
the law will keep secret that which the attorney and client keep 
secret; but any third person hearing the remarks will be compe-
tent to testify.20. 
If the statements sought to be kept out of evidence are in 
writing, substantially the same contentions of waiver can be ar-
gued. Where the writing reaches third persons by a voluntary 
act of (a) the attorney, or (b) the client, the privilege cannot be 
asserted, because in the former case the writing may no longer be 
confidential, and in the latter case the privilege may have been 
waived if the client does not assert his privilege at trial.21 
Where the statements in writing come to the knowledge of 
others by involuntary disclosure on the part of either attorney or 
client, as, for example, by loss or theft, the disclosure can be 
analogized to the "eavesdropper" situation. Following this line 
of argument, it appears that if it were not for the constitutional 
point in the Bull case, protection of the letter could have been 
denied on one of two grounds, depending on whether it was 
deemed foreseeable by the attorney that the letter would be inter-
cepted and censored. If the censoring was foreseeable, it could 
be argued that since the attorney should have known his state-
in some states the attorney apparently could not claim reversible error, 
even if the privilege were asserted by the witness-client, but wrongfully 
denied. :Model Code of Evidence. Rule 234 (1942) adopts such a view. 
is Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378, 79 Atl. 316 (1910). 
w 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (3d ed. 1940). 
20 It seems that the "eavesdropper" rule has little to commend it in a 
situation where (1) the client has not been negligent in allowing the 
communication to be overheard, and (2) the communication might tend, 
either directly or by inference, to disclose the nature of an earlier com-
munication from the client. Rule 209 ( d) of the Model Code of Evidence 
would modify the rule since it provides that the communication is "con-
fidential" so long as the client is not aware that the means of communica-
tion has disclosed the information to third persons other than those to 
whom the communication was reasonably necessary. 
21 See notes 16 and 1 7 supra. 
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ments would reach others besides his client, his disclosure was 
voluntary, and hence his statements were not made in confidence.22 
On the other hand, if disclosure resulting from the prison censor-
ship is deemed involuntary, the censor could be likened to an 
eavesdropper, and the censor would be competent to testify as to 
the contents of the letter. 
The preceding discussion has suggested that extension of an · 
evidentiary privilege to advice by an attorney questioning judi-
cial integrity might not produce the desired results for two rea-
sons: (1) since no inquiry could be made into the good faith or 
reasonableness of his remarks, an attorney might be licensed to 
make reckless and malicious attacks not intended to be encour-
aged by the privilege, and (2) the risk of disclosure resulting 
from possible application of the waiver doctrine might discourage 
uninhibited comment by the attorney. 
II. Qualified Substantive Privilege 
Application of a qualified substantive privilege to an attor-
ney's assertions, however, would avoid the problems inherent in 
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Indeed, such a privilege 
has long been recognized in the law of defamation. An attorney 
may be privileged to communicate defamatory remarks to his 
client.23 Furtherance of the attorney-client relation is felt to out-
weigh possible damage to third persons. But the privilege is sub-
ject to abuse, and the courts usually say that it is lost "if the 
publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering 
the interest which is entitled to protection."24 Such a rule acknow-
ledges a substantive privilege for the attorney to speak freely 
with his client so long as he has honest and justifiable motives, 
and yet rather effectively prevents the privilege from shielding 
reckless and unwarranted attacks upon third persons. 
There is ample reason for applying a similar substantive 
privilege to all remarks made about the judiciary in confidence by 
an attorney to his client, whether the action against the attorney 
221n Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 396 (1889) an imprisoned client 
made remarks to his attorney within earshot of the jailor. It was held 
that the communication was not made in confidence, as both attorney and 
client should have known that the jailor could overhear the client's re-
marks. Also, the client's constitutional right to counsel was not im-
paired since private consultation would have been granted had it been 
requested. 
23 Prosser, Torts 827, 834 n. 23 (1941); Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378, 
79 Atl. 316 (1910). 
24 Prosser, Torts 850 (1941); Restatement, Torts § 603 (1938). 
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be in tort, or in some other type of disciplinary proceeding. Of 
course, the argument may still be raised that existence of the 
possibility that an attorney's remarks may later be scrutinized by 
a court or jury to determine his reason or sincerity in making 
them may unduly restrict communication. But experience with 
the qualified privilege in the law of defamation tends to con-
tradict that argument. The privilege in that area of the law has 
long been subject to the qualification that it be reasonably exer-
cised, and there has been no indication that the administration of 
justice has been unduly hampered by its use. 
It has also been suggested that renderng an attorney sus-
ceptible to so-called "second-guessing" by a court or jury may in 
certain instances result in an especially harsh penalty for what 
may have been merely an ill-considered statement made in the 
heat of anger, or the bitterness of disappointment. But severe 
disciplinary actions, such as disbarment, ordinarily are not in-
itiated by the bar for a single, isolated statement by an attorney, 
unless it is terribly flagrant. Hence, the attorney will usually be 
given prior warning that his conduct is not measuring up to re-
quired ethical standards, and only upon a repeated violation of 
such standards will disciplinary action be instituted. When this 
factor is considered with the policy reasons for giving the judi-
ciary at least qualified protection from collateral attack by mem-
bers of the bar, placing final judgment with the courts as to 
whether the privilege has been reasonably exercised does not seem 
to be an undue restriction upon the attorney-client relationship. 
Charles J. Burmeister, '55 
